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Subject = Constitutional law;
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Displaying Results 1 - 2 of 2 on page 1 of 1
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Knowledge or belief concerning consent in rape law: Recommendations for change in Ireland
(2020)
Daly, Yvonne Marie
Knowledge or belief concerning consent in rape law: Recommendations for change in Ireland
(2020)
Daly, Yvonne Marie
Abstract:
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland has recommended altering the law in that jurisdiction in relation to knowledge or belief concerning consent in rape cases. Essentially, the recommendation is to move from a subjective test based on an accused’s honest belief to a primarily objective test based on reasonable belief, taking account of specific subjective aspects of personal capacity and steps taken by the accused to ascertain consent. This article outlines the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission against the backdrop of the existing law and context in Ireland. It compares the newly-proposed law with the existing law in England and Wales, explores the preference for subjectivity in Irish criminal law (and its constitutional dynamic), and considers the potential impact of the recommended change. The effect of rape myths and stereotypes on jury deliberations is a theme which runs through the article.
http://doras.dcu.ie/24539/
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The republican core of the case for judicial review: a rejoinder to Richard Bellamy
(2019)
Hickey, Tom
The republican core of the case for judicial review: a rejoinder to Richard Bellamy
(2019)
Hickey, Tom
Abstract:
The case I make for judicial review avoids what I, among others, see as the basic flaw in most of the justifications that have been offered previously. It does not rely on the notion that judges are more enlightened than legislators in respect to the resolution of rights questions. It does not hold that judicial insight is such that, with judicial review, outcomes are more likely to treat individuals with equal concern and respect. This means that the “fact of reasonable disagreement on rights” objection cannot be leveled at my case in the way that it can be leveled at legal constitutionalist cases. The republican understanding of democracy upon which I build my case not only accounts for this fact of disagreement, it relies quite heavily on it. In turn, my case relies on that fact of disagreement. I don’t think that Richard Bellamy addresses this aspect of my argument satisfactorily in his response. In fact, I think he effectively denies it and that he thereby mischaracterizes my...
http://doras.dcu.ie/24431/
Displaying Results 1 - 2 of 2 on page 1 of 1
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