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Subject = bribery;
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Displaying Results 1 - 5 of 5 on page 1 of 1
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Are new states more corrupt? Expert opinions vs. firms’ experiences
(2018)
Adhikari, Tamanna; Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert
Are new states more corrupt? Expert opinions vs. firms’ experiences
(2018)
Adhikari, Tamanna; Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert
Abstract:
We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that include additional economic, historical, and geographic controls
http://doras.dcu.ie/22103/
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Are new states more corrupt? Expert opinions vs. firms’ experiences
(2018)
Adhikari, Tamanna; Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert
Are new states more corrupt? Expert opinions vs. firms’ experiences
(2018)
Adhikari, Tamanna; Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert
Abstract:
We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that include additional economic, historical and geographic controls.
http://doras.dcu.ie/22325/
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Corruption and anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa
(2015)
Gillanders, Robert
Corruption and anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa
(2015)
Gillanders, Robert
Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between individuals’ experience of corruption and their anxiety using microeconomic data from the Afrobarometer surveys. The results show a statistically significant and economically meaningful relationship in probit models using both an experience of corruption index and a simple dummy variable. Having to pay a bribe to obtain documents and permits, to avoid problems with the police or to access medical care are the scenarios in which this relationship is strongest. Some evidence is presented that an individual needs to experience such corruption more than ‘once or twice’ for these relationships to become evident.
http://doras.dcu.ie/22329/
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Corruption and support for economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa
(2019)
Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert; Mahmalat, Mounir
Corruption and support for economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa
(2019)
Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert; Mahmalat, Mounir
Abstract:
We explore the relationship between experiences of corruption and support for economic reform in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that the relationship varies across three rounds of the Afrobarometer survey. Examining each round separately, we find that in the first round the local intensity of bribery is correlated with support for reform. In the second round an individual’s own experience of bribery matters, while in the third round neither variable is important. Estimating our model on pooled data suggests that an individual’s own experience of corruption is associated with less support for reform on average. However, we present evidence that this association is only present in the second round. These findings point to a changing relationship which may reflect rapid development in the region, including economic growth, inward investment, and the diffusion of technology. Our key contribution is to demonstrate that policy recommendations based on an analysis of one round of data or pool...
http://doras.dcu.ie/23319/
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State ownership and corruption
(2016)
Billon, Steve; Gillanders, Robert
State ownership and corruption
(2016)
Billon, Steve; Gillanders, Robert
Abstract:
We test two interesting results that can be obtained from a simplified version of the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between politicians and managers of state-owned firms. The model suggests that firms with more state ownership tend to pay less in bribes but not have a different experience of costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our full sample, the results suggest that a one percent increase in state ownership is associated with a $125 reduction in the total annual informal payment of the firm and with a 0.5% decrease in the probability that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their current operations. We refine these average relationships by splitting the sample by global region. Only in our Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong evidence in support of the first result and again we find a significant effect of state ownership on obstacles.
http://doras.dcu.ie/22335/
Displaying Results 1 - 5 of 5 on page 1 of 1
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