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Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion
Leahy, Dermot
We examine the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment in a two-period Cournot oligopoly game with learning by doing. The inability of firms and governments to precommit to future actions encourages strategic behaviour which justifies an optimal first-period export tax relative to the profit-shifting benchmark of an export subsidy. In the linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with government precommitment but decreasing in it without, in apparent contradiction to the infant-industry argument. Extensions to active foreign policy, distortionary taxation and Bertrand competition are also considered.
Keyword(s): Learning; Doing; Precommitment; Infant-Industry; Promotion
Publication Date:
1999
Type: Journal article
Peer-Reviewed: Yes
Institution: Maynooth University
Citation(s): Leahy, Dermot (1999) Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion. Review of Economic Studies, 66. pp. 447-474. ISSN 0034-6527
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
File Format(s): other
Related Link(s): http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/8474/1/66-2-447.pdf
First Indexed: 2020-04-02 06:29:06 Last Updated: 2020-04-02 06:29:06