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Export enhancing tariff protection with strategic precommitment
Leahy, Dermot
The import protection as export promotion thesis is examined from a positive and normative perspective in a series of two-stage games in which firms choose R&D and capacity in the first stage and quantity or price in the second. It is shown (i) that a tariff affects exports in two ways; firstly, with increasing marginal cost it crowds out exports; secondly by increasing R&D and/or capacity it raises exports indirectly, (ii) when firms choose R&D and quantities a small tariff will raise welfare. This result can be reversed under Bertrand competition. Not applicable A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI
Keyword(s): Protection; Export promotion; R&D; Oligopoly; Precommitment; F12; L13; Commercial policy--Mathematical models; Oligopolies; Exports--Mathematical models
Publication Date:
2010
Type: Working paper
Peer-Reviewed: Unknown
Language(s): English
Institution: University College Dublin
Publisher(s): University College Dublin. School of Economics
File Format(s): other; application/pdf
First Indexed: 2012-08-25 05:21:04 Last Updated: 2018-10-11 15:40:38