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Export subsidies and price competition
Neary, J. Peter
This paper examines optimal policy towards a home exporting firm which competes on price with a foreign firm. Two policy instruments are compared: an output subsidy and a price subsidy. The paper also considers two games: the conventional ex ante game, in which the government sets the value of the subsidy before firms set their prices, and the ex post game, where firms first set their prices in the anticipation of a subsidy by the government at the second stage. It is shown that the two types of subsidy are equivalent in the ex ante game and that a higher level of welfare can always be achieved in the ex ante than in the ex post game. This reinforces the view that optimal policy in a model characterized by Bertrand competition is an export tax rather than a subsidy. The binding of this item renders some marginal text unreadable. A hard copy is available in UCD Library at GEN 330.08 IR/UNI
Keyword(s): Export subsidies; Export duties; Competition
Publication Date:
2009
Type: Working paper
Peer-Reviewed: Unknown
Language(s): English
Institution: University College Dublin
Publisher(s): University College Dublin. School of Economics
File Format(s): other; application/pdf
First Indexed: 2012-08-25 05:22:22 Last Updated: 2018-10-11 15:43:55